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THETURNTOSABOTAGEBY
THECONGRESSMOVEMENT IN
SOUTHAFRICA*
Before the 1960s, the African National Congress (ANC) and its
allies were officially committed to the use of exclusively non-
violent means in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.
But in December 1961 a new organization, Umkhonto we Sizwe
(‘Spear of the Nation’), announced its launch with a wave of
bombings of unoccupied government installations. In the
manifesto they released at the time of these first attacks, the
commanders of the new body declared that ‘The government
policy of force, repression and violence will no longer be met
with non-violent resistance only!’ Though Umkhonto (MK)
described itself as a ‘new, independent body’, it had been
founded by Nelson Mandela of the ANC and Joe Slovo of the
South African Communist Party (SACP), with the authorization
of both bodies. Ten months after the first bombings, the ANC’s
national conference formally recognizedMKas the ‘militarywing
of our struggle’.1
Why did leaders of the ANC and its allies in the broader
Congress movement2 abandon their exclusive reliance on non-
* I am grateful to those who offered comments, criticisms and advice on earlier
iterations of this article: Emily Baughan, Adrian Bingham, Matthew Connelly,
Muriam Haleh Davis, Kate Davison, Saul Dubow, Gail Gerhart, Zoe¨ Groves, Anne
Heffernan, John Iliffe, TrentMacNamara,DanielMagaziner, OliverMurphey,Molly
Pucci and Stephen Wertheim, as well as the participants in the workshop on
‘Challenging Injustice: The Ethics and Modalities of Political Engagement’ at the
European University Institute, Florence, in 2016, and the members of the 2015–16
Max Weber HECWriting Group.
1 Command of Umkonto [sic] We Sizwe, ‘Umkonto We Sizwe’, 16 Dec. 1961;
National Executive of the ANC, ‘The People Accept the Challenge of the
Nationalists’, 6 Apr. 1963, in Thomas Karis and Gail M. Gerhart (eds.), From
Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 6 vols.,
iii, Challenge and Violence, 1953–1964 (Stanford, 1977), 716, 749.
2 I use ‘Congress movement’ (and ‘Congress’ as an adjective) to refer collectively to
both the ANC (themembership of which was, until 1969, exclusively African) and the
organizations that formally or informally were allied with or supported the ANC and
endorsed the ‘Freedom Charter’ (adopted at the 1955 ‘Congress of the People’) as a
blueprint for post-apartheid South Africa. The term ‘Congress movement’ thus
encompasses the four organizations that, together with the ANC, were members of
the formal ‘Congress Alliance’ established following the Congress of the People: the
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9
violent means and ‘turn to violence’ in 1961? In the past decade
and a half, this question has become the subject of heated
controversy amongst historians of South Africa. Until the
1990s, the topic lay at the periphery of a South African
historiography that was dominated by the study of social history
‘from below’: most scholars evinced limited interest in the
activities of the national leaders of formal political organizations.3
At a time when little archival material was available and most
of the leading protagonists were either in prison or reluctant to
talk openly about internal decision-making, those secondary
accounts that addressed the question at all tended to reiterate
the explanation Mandela himself had given in 1964 at the
Rivonia Trial, in which he and other Congress leaders were
tried for sabotage.
In his statement from the dock during the trial, Mandela
stressed the Congress movement’s long-standing commitment
to achieving change by exclusively non-violent means. Quoting
and expanding upon the justification MK’s commanders had
given in their founding manifesto, he explained that it was
‘only when all else had failed, when all channels of peaceful
protest had been barred to us, that the decision was made to
embark on violent forms of struggle. We did so not because we
desired such a course, but solely because the Government had
left us with no other choice’.4 Through the 1990s, the
explanation given by Mandela and the MK High Command —
(n. 2 cont.)
South African Indian Congress, the Coloured People’s Organisation (renamed the
Coloured People’s Congress in 1959), the [white] Congress of Democrats and the
South African Congress of Trade Unions. The term ‘Congress movement’ also
encompasses the underground SACP, which was founded in 1953, following the
banning and dissolution of the Communist Party of South Africa in 1950. Members
of the SACP were instructed in the 1950s to join the appropriate body of the above-
ground Congress Alliance, and the Party declared its ‘unqualified support’ for the
Freedom Charter.
3 Jonathan Hyslop, ‘E. P. Thompson in South Africa: The Practice and Politics of
Social History in an Era of Revolt and Transition’, International Review of Social
History, lxi (2016); Tom Lodge, ‘Reflections on Black Politics in South Africa since
1945’, South African Historical Journal, lxiv (2012); Jeremy Seekings, ‘Whose
Voices? Politics and Methodology in the Study of Political Organisation and Protest
in the Final Phase of the ‘‘Struggle’’ in South Africa’, South African Historical Journal,
lxii (2010).
4 [Nelson Mandela], ‘I Am Prepared to Die’, 20 Apr. 1964, Nelson Mandela
Foundation, available at 5http://db.nelsonmandela.org/speeches/pub_view.asp?pg¼
item&ItemID¼NMS0104.
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9
that they had remained committed to non-violence until they
concluded, in 1960–1, that government repression had rendered
exclusively peaceful methods infeasible — was repeated in most
secondary accounts.5
Much of the twenty-first-century explosion of scholarship on
the ANC’s ‘armed struggle’ has questioned this explanation.6
Instead, recent research implies that the government’s actions
in 1960–1 created an opportunity for advocates of using violent
means to implement a project to which they had long been
committed. A new consensus is emerging: the police massacre
of unarmed protesters at Sharpeville in 1960 was, in the words
of Saul Dubow, ‘not so much the proximate cause of the turn to
sabotage as the trigger for a plan that had been discussed in small
circles for some time’.7Andwhereas earlier scholarship tended to
accept Mandela’s assertion that opponents of apartheid had no
choice but to turn to violence, recent research has highlighted the
extent of contemporary opposition to that conclusion within the
Congress movement.
Within this new consensus, recent historiographical
controversy has centred on the precise identity of the advocates
and opponents of violence within the Congress movement. One
set of debates has focused on the role of the SACP. The late
Stephen Ellis argued that the Party — with the support and
encouragement of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic
of China — ‘bounced’ the ANC into adopting violence.8 More
5 Howard Barrell, MK: The ANC’s Armed Struggle (London, 1990), 1–9; Edward
Feit,UrbanRevolt inSouthAfrica:ACaseStudy (Evanston, 1971), esp. 8–9, 58–9,167–
70; Sheridan Johns, ‘Obstacles to Guerrilla Warfare — A South African Case Study’,
Journal of Modern African Studies, xi (1973), 267–73; [Thomas Karis], ‘The Turn to
Violence since May 31, 1961’, in Karis and Gerhart (eds.), From Protest to Challenge,
iii, Challenge and Violence, 645–9, 659; Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since
1945 (London, 1983), 231–5.
6 For an overview of recent debates, see Thula Simpson, ‘NelsonMandela and the
Genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle:Notes onMethod’, Journal of Southern African
Studies, xliv (2018), 133–48. An important catalyst for this explosion of interest was
the publication of Bernard Magubane et al., ‘The Turn to Armed Struggle’, in South
African Democracy Education Trust (SADET), The Road to Democracy in South
Africa, 7 vols., i, 1960–1970 (Cape Town, 2004).
7 Saul Dubow, ‘Were There Political Alternatives in the Wake of the Sharpeville-
Langa Violence in South Africa, 1960?’, Journal of African History, lvi (2015), 131.
8 Stephen Ellis, ‘The Genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle in South Africa 1948–
1961’, Journal of Southern African Studies, xxxvii (2011); Stephen Ellis, ‘Nelson
Mandela, the South African Communist Party and the Origins of Umkhonto we
Sizwe’, Cold War History, xvi (2016).
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9
plausibly, Paul Landau has qualified that conclusion by
disaggregating the SACP: the ‘turn to violence’ was a project
not of the Party as a whole, Landau argues, but rather of the
so-called ‘Sophiatown group’, a group of ‘Communist African
men from within the ANC hierarchy’ including, most
importantly, Walter Sisulu and Nelson Mandela.9 A second set
of debates has focused on the role and attitude of Albert Lutuli,
president of the ANC from 1952 to 1967. Contradicting decades
of assertions by ANC representatives, Scott Couper has argued
that Lutuli remained committed to the exclusive use of non-
violence and that he consistently opposed the use of violence.10
Couper’s claims provoked a storm of controversy, both in the
public sphere in South Africa and amongst scholars.11
As the participants in these controversies emphasize, such
debates are of obvious relevance to the politics of
commemoration and legitimacy in contemporary South Africa.12
But they also leave crucial historical questions unexamined.
In much of the recent literature, the question of who supported
the ‘turn to violence’ either simply replaces or is assumed to
answer the question of why it happened. It is implicit in Ellis’s
account, for instance, that the commitment of MK’s founders to
using violent means was inherent in their commitment to
communism.13 In the accounts of those scholars sceptical of
Ellis’s tale of communist conspiracy, the supposed long-standing
9 Paul S. Landau, ‘The ANC, MK, and ‘‘The Turn to Violence’’ (1960–1962)’,
South African Historical Journal, lxiv (2012). See also Dubow, ‘Were There Political
Alternatives’; Tom Lodge, ‘Secret Party: South African Communists between 1950
and 1960’, South African Historical Journal, lxvii (2015), 453–64.
10 Scott Couper, Albert Luthuli: Bound by Faith (Scottsville, 2010).
11 Raymond Suttner, ‘ ‘‘The Road to Freedom is via the Cross’’: ‘‘Just Means’’ in
Chief Albert Luthuli’s Life’,SouthAfricanHistorical Journal, lxii (2010); RobertTrent
Vinson andBenedictCarton, ‘AlbertLuthuli’s Private Struggle:Howan IconofPeace
Came to Accept Sabotage in South Africa’, Journal of African History, lix (2018).
12 In addition to the works cited above, see, for instance, Scott Couper, ‘Irony upon
Irony upon Irony: The Mythologising of Nationalist History in South Africa’, South
African Historical Journal, lxiii (2011); Stephen Ellis, ‘ANC Suppresses Real History
toBoost its Claim toLegitimacy’,Mail&Guardian, 3 Jan. 2014, at5https://mg.co.za/
article/2014-01-02-anc-suppresses-real-history-to-boost-its-claim-to-legitimacy4.
13 In earlier work, Ellis and his then co-author explained the SACP’s ‘faith in armed
struggle’ as conforming ‘to the Marxist-Leninist tradition, established in 1917, of
seeking power by force rather than other means’. Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba
[Oyama Mabandla], Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African
Communist Party in Exile (London, 1991), 200.
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9
commitment to ‘armed struggle’ on the part of Mandela, Sisulu
and their fellow ‘hardliners’ is left unexplained.
Also unexplained is the specific form of violence that the
founders of MK initially adopted. Of the various forms of violent
action they could have undertaken, why did MK’s commanders
initially launch a campaign of non-lethal sabotage? In his address
from the dock, Mandela, with his emphasis on the Congress
movement’s long-standing preference for peaceful solutions,
again echoed claims made in MK’s original manifesto. The
organization’s commanders, Mandela insisted, chose sabotage in
the hope that the abolition of white supremacy might still be
achieved without the far more extensive and interpersonal
violence of civil war. They hoped, he explained, that sabotage
‘would in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of
thecountry, thuscompelling thevoters of thecountry to reconsider
their position’.14 Hamstrung by a lack of sources, most older
studies tended to quote the explanations for MK’s use of
sabotage that were given at the time by Mandela and the MK
High Command.
In contrast, most recent scholars now assume that MK’s
commanders understood sabotage, in Landau’s words, as ‘not
just a nudge to the state, not just ‘‘armed propaganda’’, but [as]
a prelude to, or a part of, guerrilla war ’.15 But historians have not
explained why MK’s commanders should have believed that a
campaign of bombing symbolic targets in urban areas was a
necessary prelude to guerrilla warfare. Though naturalized in
most recent accounts, this approach was highly unusual. None
of the guerrilla insurgencies that liberationmovements attempted
to launch against colonial and white minority rule elsewhere in
southern Africa in the 1960s involved a distinct, preliminary and
extended phase of non-lethal symbolic sabotage. Nor did the
earlier guerrilla struggles further afield from which Congress
leaders drew inspiration.
In South Africa and beyond, historiographical attention has
begun to shift from the history of resistance ‘from below’ to the
ideas and the international influences and interactions of those
14 [Mandela], ‘I Am Prepared to Die’.
15 Landau, ‘ANC,MK, and ‘‘TheTurn toViolence’’ ’, 554–7. For a notable dissent
from this interpretation, see Thula Simpson, ‘The People’s War of Umkhonto we
Sizwe, 1961–1990’ (School of Oriental and African Studies, Univ. of London Ph.D.
thesis, 2006), 67–74.
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9
‘above’. Much recent scholarship on the ‘armed struggle’ in
South Africa has, for instance, emphasized the influence on the
Congress leadership of external actors and models from the
Soviet Union, China, Algeria, Palestine, Cuba and elsewhere.16
Such emphases reflect both the welcome re-emergence of
attention to ‘high politics’ in African history, and the broader
‘transnational turn’ in the historical profession. But there is a
danger — in this field as in others — that overemphasis on the
transnational networks and connections of elite actors can
obscure the internal dynamics of the organizations they led.
Too narrow a focus on the high politics of resistance can lead
historians to treat every political action as a direct attempt to
influence or overthrow the oppressor, and to misinterpret
activities intended to mobilize, maintain or manage potentially
supportive constituencies. And a transnational lens should
illuminate not only similarities and connections, but also
differences and disconnects.
This article advances an interpretation of the Congress
movement’s ‘turn to violence’ that explains both why the
founders of MK decided in 1960–1 (and not earlier) to
abandon their reliance on exclusively non-violent methods,
and why their ‘turn to violence’ took the specific and unusual
form that it did. A number of both older and more recent
accounts note in passing that one of the reasons Mandela gave
at the Rivonia Trial for founding MK was that he and his
comrades had believed that
violence by the African people had become inevitable, and that unless
responsible leadership was given to canalise and control the feelings of
our people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism which would produce
an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the various races of the
country which is not produced even by war.17
There is now extensive evidence that this factor was not simply
‘another consideration’ or one of a number of ‘other motives’ of
the founders of MK.18 Rather, the evidence now available shows
16 Ellis, ‘Genesis of the ANC’s Armed Struggle’, 660–4, 671–2; Landau, ‘ANC,
MK, and ‘‘The Turn to Violence,’’ ’ 540, 546, 555–9; Elleke Boehmer, Nelson
Mandela: AVery Short Introduction (Oxford, 2008), 104–7; Allison Drew, ‘Visions of
Liberation:TheAlgerianWar of Independence and its SouthAfricanReverberations’,
Review of African Political Economy, xlii (2015); Robert J. C. Young, ‘Fanon and the
Turn to Armed Struggle in Africa’,Wasafiri, xx (2005).
17 [Mandela], ‘I Am Prepared to Die’.
18 Lodge, Black Politics, 233; [Karis], ‘Turn to Violence’, 647.
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9
that both before and during the ‘turn to sabotage’, the
determining factor in Congress leaders’ attitudes towards the
use of violent means was their fear of the social and political
consequences of popular enthusiasm for violence and of the
possibility that such popular enthusiasm might lead to violence
becoming indiscriminate. Once the decision to ‘turn to violence’
had been made, the same fear also determined the form of the
violent activities that were undertaken by MK.
The evidence for this interpretation includes previously
undiscovered archival materials in South Africa and beyond,19 as
well as internal MK documents that were captured by the
police and submitted as evidence in the Rivonia Trial. The
archival record is, however, fragmentary: often, potentially
incriminating records were not kept at all, or were destroyed in
order to prevent their capture. Despite the limitations of
memory-based sources for analysing the history of strategy and
decision-making, this article also draws on memoirs and on oral
histories conducted and made available by previous researchers.
Particularly valuable are those oral histories that were conducted
between 1989 and 1994 by interviewers who were — to varying
degrees — ‘insiders’, trusted by their interviewees. In this
transitional period of increasing openness, leading protagonists
had been released from prison and Congress leaders were
more willing than previously to discuss internal decision-
making. But the exact outcome of the struggle against
apartheid was not yet known. Retrospective and teleological
narratives had not yet solidified.20
Far from having a long-standing ‘plan’ for eventual violent
struggle, Congress leaders — including the future founders of
MK — spent the 1950s resisting and suppressing popular
enthusiasm for the use of violence. The decisive change in
1960–1 that led some Congress leaders to change course was
not so much the increase in repression after Sharpeville, but the
rise in grass-roots enthusiasm for using violence and the
19 See ns. 68, 91, 95 and 117 below.
20 ‘Insider’ interviewers included Howard Barrell, a former member of the ANC
who had ‘worked with, or under [some of his interviewees] on clandestine ANC
projects’, and Barbara Harmel, the daughter of leading SACP theorist Michael
Harmel, who had herself joined the Congress underground in 1963 before going
into exile in 1964. Howard Barrell, ‘Conscripts to their Age: African National
Congress Operational Strategy, 1976–1986’ (Univ. of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1993),
19–21; see also further discussions of oral sources in Simpson, ‘People’sWar’, 26–30.
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9
emergence of rival groups that might channel that enthusiasm if
the Congress movement did not. The MK High Command did
not launch their campaign of urban sabotage because they
believed that this would prompt a white change of heart, nor
because they believed that such a campaign was a necessary
prelude to the launch of rural guerrilla warfare. Rather,
sabotage bombings were a spectacular placeholder, a stopgap
intended to advertise the Congress movement’s abandonment
of exclusive non-violence and thus to discourage opponents of
apartheid from supporting rival groups or initiating violent
action themselves. Following the first bombings in 1961,
Congress leaders quickly concluded that the sabotage
campaign had achieved these objectives. But the campaign had
unexpected consequences that ultimately undermined the
Congress movement’s ability to undertake other forms of
action against apartheid.
I
AVERTING A SOUTH AFRICAN ‘MAU MAU’ IN THE 1950S
For years before MK was formed, national leaders of the
Congress movement felt under pressure from their own
constituency to adopt some form of violent action. ‘Through
the 1950s there was this pressure from below’, recalled Govan
Mbeki, a member of the ANC National Executive and of the
SACP Central Committee.21 In both urban and rural areas,
this pressure to adopt some form of violent action came from
some in the lower leadership tiers of the ANC’s regional and
local structures and from grass-roots activists, as well as from
the broader African constituency to which Congress leaders
sought to appeal.
In the countryside, recollections and oral traditions of primary
resistance to colonization fuelled scepticism of the Congress
movement’s exclusive adherence to non-violence. Mbeki
recalled a rural meeting during the Congress movement’s
‘Defiance Campaign’ of civil disobedience in 1952 at which one
old man told him that Africans had been defeated in the wars of
colonization because of the colonizers’ superior weaponry. Until
21 GovanMbeki, interview by Phil Bonner andBarbaraHarmel, 28Oct. 1993, p. 7,
B7.2, Barbara Harmel Interviews, Historical Papers Research Archive (aka Wits
Historical Papers: hereafter WHP), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
228 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 245
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/p
a
s
t/a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/2
4
5
/1
/2
2
1
/5
5
8
0
5
6
0
 b
y
 U
n
iv
e
rs
ity
 o
f S
h
e
ffie
ld
 u
s
e
r o
n
 0
3
 D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r 2
0
1
9
this imbalance of firepower was corrected, the man told Mbeki,
non-violent defiance was pointless and would do no more than
‘tickle the Boers’.22
Throughout the 1950s, as Mbeki noted, Africans frequently
resorted to violent forms of resistance to state intervention in
rural societies, ‘whether or not the ANC or the SACP
supported their action’.23 Sometimes such resistance took the
form of sabotage, such as burning crops, or destroying dipping
tanks or fences.More occasionally, resistance escalated intomore
widespread violence: in rural revolts, most notably in Zeerust in
1957–8 and Sekhukhuneland in 1958, Africans suspected of
collaborating with the government were burned out of their
homes, assaulted and sometimes killed. Some ANC and SACP
members were involved in these rural revolts, includingmembers
of local leadership structures. The revolt in Sekhukhuneland, for
instance, may have been influenced by Flag Boshielo, a member
of the ANC’s Transvaal provincial executive and the SACP’s
Johannesburg District Committee, who had immersed himself
in reading about the Mau Mau revolt against British rule in
Kenya and argued for the adoption of similar guerrilla tactics
in South Africa.24
In the cities, tsotsis— youthful African gang members — were
especially scornful of the ANC’s exclusive adherence to non-
violence. Former gang leader Don Mattera recalled meeting
ANC activists in the 1950s in Sophiatown, the freehold suburb
west of Johannesburg, and wondering ‘When are these people
going to fight?’25 When the ANC recruited five hundred local
‘Freedom Volunteers’ to oppose the government’s plan to start
removing the entire African population from Sophiatown in
1955, the volunteers demanded that the Congress leadership
allow them to erect barricades and resist with force.26
22 Mbeki, interview by Bonner and Harmel, 5.
23 Govan Mbeki, The Struggle for Liberation in South Africa: A Short History (Cape
Town, 1992), 88.
24 Peter Delius, A Lion amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the
Northern Transvaal (Portsmouth, NH, 1996), 131–2.
25 Clive Glaser, ‘ ‘‘When Are TheyGoing to Fight?’’ Tsotsis, Youth Politics and the
PAC’, in Philip Bonner, Peter Delius and Deborah Posel (eds.), Apartheid’s Genesis,
1935–1962 (Braamfontein, 1993), 301.
26 Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela, untitled jail memoir, n.d. [1976], 160–1, Nelson
Mandela Foundation, available at5https://www.nelsonmandela.org/images/uploads/
LWOM.pdf4; Walter Sisulu, I Will Go Singing: Walter Sisulu Speaks of his Life and
Struggle for Freedom (Cape Town, 2001), 103.
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As in rural areas, Africans in the cities frequently resorted to
violent forms of resistance to state intervention without the
sanction of the national Congress leadership. Tsotsis were
frequently involved in violent interpersonal clashes with police
attempting to intervene in African urban life. Whereas the
ANC was still perceived to be preoccupied with the politics of
memoranda and petitions, Mattera recalled, ‘Our memorandum
was a knife and a gun.We petitioned ourselves in blood’.27Urban
resistance sometimes took the form of targeted sabotage, such as
destroying municipal offices or government beer halls, or more
extensive rioting. Most famously, riots broke out in Port
Elizabeth, Kimberley and East London during the Defiance
Campaign. Six white bystanders were killed by the rioters.
Within the Congress leadership, some Gandhians and liberal
nationalists — including ANC president Lutuli — rejected
violence on principle. But many others — including Mandela
and his close comrade Walter Sisulu, the ANC’s secretary-
general — believed that the use of violent methods was not a
matter of principle but of the tactics best suited to the
prevailing circumstances.28 Given the pressure from below to
abandon exclusive non-violence, and the unsanctioned violent
activity by their subordinates, supporters and wider
constituency, Congress leaders frequently debated whether
circumstances warranted a change in approach. In 1953,
Mandela asked Sisulu to visit China to explore whether Mao
Tse-tung’s government would provide assistance — including
weaponry — if the ANC were to adopt violent methods. Sisulu
happened to visit China at a particularly unpropitious moment,
however: the armistice halting the Korean War and the adoption
of China’s first Five-Year Plan the same year had had the
combined effect of tempering the Chinese government’s
enthusiasm for supporting revolution elsewhere and of focusing
its attention on its domestic agenda.29Chinese officials cautioned
27 Glaser, ‘ ‘‘When Are They Going to Fight?’’ ’, 301.
28 Mandela, jail memoir, 329; ‘Mandela–Stengel Conversations: Transcripts of the
Audio Recordings of Conversations in 1992 and 1993 between NelsonMandela and
Richard Stengel during the Making of Long Walk to Freedom’, pp. 377–8, 441, 521,
unpublished document, Nelson Mandela Foundation, Johannesburg.
29 Qiang Zhai,China and the VietnamWars, 1950–1975 (ChapelHill, 2000), 49–50,
54–5.
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9
Sisulu that violent struggle was ‘not child’s play’ and should
only be attempted when the conditions were right.30
Throughout the 1950s theCongress leadership always decided
against initiating or preparing for any formof violent action.With
hindsight — long after the ANC had subsequently ‘turned to
violence’ — Sisulu and Mandela would sometimes claim later
that, by the time of Sisulu’s visit to China, ‘though we believed
in the policy of nonviolence, we knew in our heart of hearts it
wasn’t going to be a satisfactory answer’. In his memoirs,
Mandela recalled surveying the dense forest during a drive
though the Eastern Cape in 1955 and dwelling on ‘the fact that
there were many places a guerrilla army could live and train
undetected’.31 But while Mandela and Sisulu did not rule out
the possibility that a change of circumstances might warrant the
use of violence at some future point, they did not behave as
though they believed such a change was imminent or likely.
Despite Chinese officials’ insistence to Sisulu that ‘You have to
prepare’, Mandela and Sisulu did not undertake any logistical or
educational preparations for turning their guerrilla daydreams
into reality.32
Congress leaders not only resisted pressure from below for the
Congressmovement itself to initiate or prepare for violent action.
They also declined to sanction or facilitate violent activity by
supporters. When rebels from Sekhukhuneland asked the
Congress leadership to provide them with guns in 1958, for
instance, they were sent away empty-handed.33 Instead,
Congress leaders condemned and sought to suppress the
unsanctioned violent activity that nonetheless occurred. In
1952 the local ANC leadership publicly condemned the riots in
Port Elizabeth as an ‘unfortunate, reckless, ill-considered return
to jungle law’. The rioters in East London, Joe Slovo declared
while defending some of them in court, were ‘natives of
a primitive state’.34
30 Walter Sisulu, interview by Phil Bonner, 15 July 1993, p. 4, B21.4;Walter Sisulu,
interview by Barbara Harmel, 11 Nov. 1993, pp. 6–7, B21.6, Harmel Interviews.
31 Sisulu, I Will Go Singing, 89; Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London,
1995), 183, 218–19.
32 Sisulu, interview by Harmel, 11 Nov. 1993, 7.
33 Delius, Lion amongst the Cattle, 132.
34 ‘Statement on Violence in New Brighton, Port Elizabeth . . . by Local ANC
Leaders’, 20 Oct. 1952, in Thomas Karis (ed.), From Protest to Challenge: A
Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, ii, Hope and Challenge, 1935–
231THE TURN TO SABOTAGE IN SOUTH AFRICA
(cont. on p. 232)
D
o
w
n
lo
a
d
e
d
 fro
m
 h
ttp
s
://a
c
a
d
e
m
ic
.o
u
p
.c
o
m
/p
a
s
t/a
rtic
le
-a
b
s
tra
c
t/2
4
5
/1
/2
2
1
/5
5
8
0
5
6
0
 b
y
 U
n
iv
e
rs
ity
 o
f S
h
e
ffie
ld
 u
s
e
r o
n
 0
3
 D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r 2
0
1
9
Mandela, Sisulu and other national leaders of the Congress
movement continued to adhere to exclusive non-violence in
part because of their optimism about what could be achieved by
non-violent action. The ANC’s deputy president Oliver Tambo
explained to an interviewer in 1963 that in the previous decade
Congress leaders had ‘thought that they wouldn’t need violence,
that large numbers and mass demonstrations would be
sufficient’.35 Most Congress leaders in the 1950s did not
seriously believe that the National Party politicians then
implementing apartheid could themselves be compelled to
change their ways. But they did think that it might be possible
to bring about a realignment in white politics that would remove
the architects of apartheid from power and lead eventually to the
abolition of white supremacy.36
Optimism that apartheid could be ended quickly and peacefully
was fuelled both by Congress leaders’ own experiences in the
course of the decade and by the rapid progress of decolonization
elsewhere in Asia and Africa. For some, it was also confirmed by
shifts in the strategic line of the international communist
movement. In 1956 Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev endorsed
the shifts in strategic thinking already under way in some
western European communist parties, arguing that ‘violence
and civil war’ were not ‘the only way to remake society’ and
affirming the possibility of achieving a transition to socialism by
‘parliamentary means’. These shifts were carefully observed by
communists in South Africa: commitment to communism did
not translate automatically into a belief that ending apartheid
must necessarily involve violence.37
(n. 34 cont.)
1952 (Stanford, 1973), 485; AnneMager andGaryMinkley, ‘Reaping theWhirlwind:
The East London Riots of 1952’, in Bonner, Delius and Posel (eds.), Apartheid’s
Genesis, 231.
35 [GwendolenCarter], ‘DiscussionwithOliverTambo’, 15Nov. 1963, p. 4, Folder
37,Part 1,Karis–GerhartCollectionof SouthAfricanPoliticalMaterials, 1964–1990,
WHP.
36 Simon Stevens, ‘Boycotts and Sanctions against South Africa: An International
History, 1946–1970’ (Columbia Univ. Ph.D. diss., 2016), 127–9.
37 Nikita Khrushchev, ‘From the ‘‘Report of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 20th Congress of the CPSU’’ ’, 14 Feb.
1956, in On Peaceful Co-Existence (Moscow, 1961), 12–14; Lionel Forman, ‘Why
Do We Write — and Argue — So Little About Socialism?’, Fighting Talk, Nov.
1956, 16; Michael Harmel, ‘Revolutions Are Not Abnormal’, Africa South, Jan.–
Mar. 1959, 17.
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Mandela, Sisulu and most other Congress leaders remained
committed to exclusive non-violence not only because of their
optimism about what they could achieve in this way, but also
because of their pessimism about the possible consequences of
initiating or sanctioning violent activity. British journalist
Anthony Sampson, who edited Drummagazine in Johannesburg
from 1951 to 1955, observed that ‘a disunited rising of an angry
mob was much more of a nightmare to Congress than to the
Government leaders who so freely invoked it as a danger’.38 In
Kenya in the same period, the educated, moderate nationalist
leadership of the Kenya African Union had been displaced by
mostly younger ‘Mau Mau’ Kikuyu militants committed to the
use of violent means, including the assassination of African
informers and government employees and (on a much smaller
scale) the killing of white settlers. This had led to an intra-
Kikuyu civil war, racial polarization and massive repression
by the colonial state. Congress leaders had no desire to initiate
or sanction activity that might unleash similar dynamics in
South Africa.
Congress leaders’ pessimism about the consequences of
violence had two dimensions. First, they believed that although
the architects of apartheid were politically vulnerable, the
strength of the state apparatus they controlled would enable
them to respond to violent resistance with drastic repression
against black South Africans and their political organizations.
The police had suppressed the rioting in East London in 1952
with murderous violence, killing as many as two hundred
people.39 ‘The reason why non-violence was stressed so much
before 1961’, Tambo explained two years later, ‘was that it was
obvious that violent tactics would be met by overwhelming
retaliation’.40 At the moment when the national Congress
leadership came closest to sanctioning the use of violence —
when the ANC’s volunteers wanted to resist the 1955
Sophiatown removals with force — Congress leaders pulled
38 Anthony Sampson, The Treason Cage: The Opposition on Trial in South Africa
(London, 1958), 96.
39 Oliver M. Murphy, ‘Race, Violence, and Nation: African Nationalism and
Popular Politics in South Africa’s Eastern Cape, 1948–1970’ (Univ. of Oxford
D.Phil. thesis, 2013), 87–95.
40 [Carter], ‘Discussion with Oliver Tambo’, 4.
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back precisely because most of them concluded that violent
resistance would be ‘suicide’.41
Second, Congress leaders were pessimistic about the
consequences of violence because they feared not only the
reaction of the government, but also the reaction of their own
political constituency. The Congress leadership was haunted by
the fear that action by their supporters could spiral out of their
control into indiscriminate and/or racialized violence. This fear
shaped their approach even to exclusively non-violent campaigns.
Congress leaders organized their campaigns in ways they hoped
would enable them to maintain control and minimize the
likelihood of violent confrontations. The 1952 Defiance
Campaign, for instance, did not involve mass civil
disobedience. The campaign was carefully orchestrated: acts of
disobedience were to be carried out only by ‘selected and trained’
volunteers.42 And as Mbeki later explained, the Defiance
Campaign was not carried out in areas where Congress leaders
feared ‘we won’t be able to control it’: Mbeki himself had advised
against expanding the campaign to the rural Transkei because he
feared Congress leaders would be unable ‘to stop the peasants
attacking [isolated white] traders’.43
Congress leaders were even more sceptical that they would be
able to control their supporters in any kind of violent activity.
Though Congress representatives expressed solidarity with the
opponents of colonial rule in Kenya, few of the more senior
members of the ANC shared Flag Boshielo’s enthusiasm for
Mau Mau as a model. ‘Mau-Mau tactics’, associated with
indiscriminate violence against African ‘loyalists’ and white
settlers, were to be condemned and discouraged, not
replicated.44 Raymond Mhlaba, an ANC and SACP leader
based in Port Elizabeth, who by his own account was one of the
41 Mandela, jail memoir, 160–1; Sisulu, I Will Go Singing, 103.
42 J. S. Moroka et al., ‘Report of the Joint Planning Council’, 8 Nov. 1951, in Karis
(ed.), From Protest to Challenge, ii, Hope and Challenge, 462; Julian Brown, ‘Public
Protest and Violence in South Africa, 1948–1976’ (Univ. of Oxford D.Phil. thesis,
2009), 40–54.
43 Mbeki, interview by Bonner and Harmel, 6.
44 Mandela, jail memoir, 289; Anna Kelk Mager,Gender and the Making of a South
African Bantustan: A Social History of the Ciskei, 1945–1959 (Portsmouth, NH, 1999),
83; Leslie J. Bank and Benedict Carton, ‘Forgetting Apartheid: History, Culture and
the Body of a Nun’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, lxxxvi (2016),
479 n. 33.
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9
first senior leaders to begin ‘advocating armed struggle’ in the late
1950s, found that other Congress leaders thought he was ‘mad’.
The prospect of a ‘racial war’, he recalled, was ‘the fundamental
fear regarding armed struggle’.45
II
DECIDING TO FORM UMKHONTO WE SIZWE, 1960–1961
Mandela thus summed up the political dynamic of the 1950s
accurately when he stated at the Rivonia Trial that ‘for a long
time the people had been talking of violence — of the day when
they would fight the white man and win back their country, and
we, the leaders of the ANC, had nevertheless always prevailed
upon them to avoid violence and to pursue peaceful methods’.46
This dynamic changed after the Sharpeville massacre on 21
March 1960, when police fired on a crowd of peaceful protesters
mobilized by the rival Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which had
broken away from the ANC the previous year. InDecember 1960
the underground SACP’s national conference resolved that the
Congress movement as a whole must reconsider ‘its tactics of
exclusive reliance on non-violent methods’. The conference
delegates — who included long-standing white and black
communists like Slovo and the Party’s general secretary, Moses
Kotane, aswell asmore recent recruits like Sisulu, andMandela47
— mandated ‘steps to initiate the training and equipping of
selected personnel in new methods of struggle, and thus prepare
the nucleus of an adequate apparatus to lead struggles of a more
forcible and violent character’.48
In June 1961 Mandela presented a proposal to ‘turn to
violence’ to the ANC National Executive, and then to the Joint
Executives of the Congress Alliance, the umbrella body of the
ANC and its formal allies (the South African Indian Congress,
the Coloured People’s Congress, the Congress of [white]
45 RaymondMhlaba, interview by Phil Bonner and Barbara Harmel, 27 Oct. 1993
[Part II], B8.1, Harmel Interviews.
46 [Mandela], ‘I Am Prepared to Die’.
47 For the most measured assessment of the available evidence on the controversial
subject of Mandela’s relationship with the SACP, see Lodge, ‘Secret Party’, 460–2.
48 Quoted in ‘Memorandum’, n.d. [c.late 1962/early 1963], p. 1, File A6.1.4.1,
Ronald Kasrils Papers, WHP.
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9
Democrats and the South African Congress of Trade Unions).
Several senior participants in these meetings, including Lutuli,
vigorously opposed Mandela’s proposal. But eventually they
acquiesced to a compromise: Mandela was permitted to form
an independent body to carry out acts of violence, while the
ANC and the other member organizations of the Alliance
would continue to engage in non-violent activity. Mandela
subsequently formed a ‘High Command’, including Sisulu,
Slovo and Mandela himself as commander-in-chief. The SACP
squads Slovo had already established in accordance with the
Party’s December conference decision were merged into the
new organization, Umkhonto we Sizwe.49
In part, theCongress leadership’s greater openness to the use of
violent means was a response to intensified repression after
Sharpeville. Ten days after the massacre, the government
declared a state of emergency: nearly two thousand activists —
including almost the entire Congress Alliance leadership —were
imprisonedwithout trial. On 8April 1960, both theANCand the
PACwere banned.The arrests caught theCongress leadership off
guard: themovement was effectively paralysed inside the country
until the end of August, when the emergency was lifted and those
still detained were released. Nevertheless, the initial
intensification of repression following the Sharpeville
Emergency was a shift more in degree than in kind, and did not
immediately cause Congress leaders to revise their assessment of
the nature of their opponent. Though horrifying in its scale, the
massacre of more than sixty-nine unarmed protesters at
Sharpeville was far from the first time South African police had
used lethal force. Nor was the banning of the ANC unexpected:
this long-threatenedmove had been anticipated for several years.
What shifted the calculations of many Congress leaders in
1960–1 was less the reaction of the government than the
reaction of their own supporters and broader constituency.
During the nineteen days it took the government to restore
order after Sharpeville, there was a massive upsurge in protest
and violence across the country. To protest the massacre, Lutuli
called for supporters to burn their passes and participate in a one-
day ‘stay-at-home’. Butmanywent further, setting fire not only to
their own passes, but to schools, churches, buses and municipal
49 Mandela, jail memoir, 421–5.
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offices.50 In rural areas therewere further outbreaks in1960of the
violent resistance that had been a frequent feature of the 1950s.
Most dramatically, the Intaba (‘Mountain’) movement in
Mpondoland launched violent attacks on government-
appointed chiefs and was able to establish itself as an alternative
political authority for several months. Like their predecessors in
Sekhukhuneland, the Mpondo rebels requested that the
Congress leadership provide them with firearms.51
In some areas the Sharpeville crisis prompted the formation of
organized groups of ANC supporters disillusioned with their
leadership’s insistence on non-violence. These groups,
Mandela explained at the Rivonia Trial, began ‘spontaneously
making plans for violent forms of political struggle’.52 One such
group in Durban wanted to adopt what they called ‘Mau Mau
tactics’: they began stockpiling bush knives and planned —
according to future South African president Jacob Zuma — to
go into the centre of the city ‘and start butchering everybody.
Once they called the police, we would disappear. We would run
off to a hiding place to conduct the war’.53
Many Congress leaders worried that if they themselves didn’t
respond to the intensified pressure from below to use violent
means, another group might do so and attract mass support.
This could be disastrous for the Congress movement’s leading
position in the struggle against apartheid and — if that struggle
were successful — in a future post-apartheid dispensation. In the
1950s, pressure from below had largely been containedwithin the
Congress movement: there had been few alternative
organizational outlets for it. That was no longer the case after
the breakaway of the PAC in 1958–9. Though the PAC’s first
campaigns were non-violent, PAC leaders often implied the
inevitability or even desirability of violence in their speeches.
Their confrontational rhetoric and celebration of spontaneous
50 Archie Sibeko with Joyce Leeson, Freedom in our Lifetime (Durban, 1996), 51;
Squire Makgothi, interview by Phil Bonner, 22 Feb. 1994, p. 34, B5.1, Harmel
Interviews; Lodge, Black Politics, 224.
51 Thomas Nkob[i], interview by Phil Bonner, 24 Nov. 1993, pp. 1–3, B16.2,
Harmel Interviews; Ben Turok, interview by Howard Barrell, 21 Feb. 1990, pp.
1322–3, 3/2, Papers of Howard Barrell, Bodleian Library, Oxford; Joe Slovo, Slovo:
The Unfinished Autobiography (Melbourne, 1997), 175.
52 [Mandela], ‘I Am Prepared to Die’.
53 Douglas Foster, After Mandela: The Struggle for Freedom in Post-Apartheid South
Africa (New York, 2012), 305–6.
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political actionwereunderstoodbymanyof their recruits as signs of
commitment to violent struggle.54 While most of the PAC
leadership was incapacitated in prison in 1960–1, groups of
PAC supporters calling themselves ‘Poqo’ began preparing for
insurrectionary violence.55 At the same time, the Sharpeville
crisis prompted the formation of additional independent groups
committed to using violence. In Johannesburg, a handful of
dissident white leftists, liberals and ANC members formed the
NationalCommittee forLiberation (NCL). InPretoria, dissident
ANC members formed the ‘African Freedom Movement’ to
replace what they viewed as the moribund ANC.56
Some Congress leaders feared that, if they did not initiate
violence themselves, these other groups might attract both
further defectors from the Congress movement itself and those
who were organizationally unaligned. Mandela made this fear of
being outflanked the centrepiece of his argument to the Joint
Executives of the Congress Alliance in June 1961: ‘there is no
other way the ANC can remain on top’, he insisted, ‘unless it
takes a lead on the question of armed struggle’.57 Congress
leaders’ fears of being eclipsed by a rival group were
exacerbated by the apparent weakness of the National Party
government after Sharpeville. In the immediate aftermath of the
massacre, the government temporarily suspended the pass laws,
and briefly struggled to restore order. Amidst a crisis of economic
confidence, Afrikaner business leaders, churchmen and politicians
— including some members of the government — joined the
English-speaking white opposition in critiquing apartheid policies
and advocating reform. In these circumstances, Congress leaders
feared that a rival group might be able to seize the moment and
emerge as the dominant player both in the struggle against
apartheid and in post-apartheid South Africa. In deciding to take
54 Gail M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology
(Berkeley, 1978), 220–1.
55 TomLodge, ‘Insurrectionism in South Africa: The Pan-Africanist Congress and
the Poqo Movement, 1959–1965’ (Univ. of York Ph.D. thesis, 1984), 189–203.
56 Magnus Gunther, ‘The National Committee of Liberation (NCL)/African
Resistance Movement (ARM)’, in SADET, Road to Democracy in South Africa, i,
1960–1970, 2
nd
edn (Pretoria, 2010), 194–204.
57 ‘Mandela–Stengel Conversations’, 620.
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9
violent action in 1961, observed Denis Goldberg, who joined the
MK Regional Command in Cape Town, ‘people [were] staking
out claims for the future’.58
This fear of being eclipsed by a rival was further exacerbated by
the lessons Congress leaders drew from violent struggles
elsewhere, especially the recent revolutionary conflict in Cuba
and the ongoing war against French rule in Algeria. The
fundamental lesson they drew was the one Mandela noted
down verbatim from Che Guevara’s critique of the ‘defeatist’
approach of orthodox communist parties in Latin America in
his newly published handbook on Guerrilla Warfare: ‘It is not
necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution
exist; the insurrection can create them’.59 This lesson was not
only an inspiration. It was also a warning. The communist
parties in both Algeria and Cuba had insisted that conditions
were not ripe for violent action, and had been outflanked by
other groups — the Front de Libe´ration Nationale (FLN) and
Fidel Castro’s 26th of July Movement respectively — whose
armed attacks communist leaders initially declined to endorse
or even condemned as terrorism, putschism or adventurism.60
At one SACP meeting, Slovo highlighted these two cases and
warned that ‘the world communist movement on [was] going to
be left out’ if communist parties elsewheremade the samemistake
of waiting for the ‘objective conditions’ for violent action.61
Mandela drew upon the same salutary lesson in June 1961
when a sceptical Moses Kotane initially vetoed his request to
present his proposal to ‘turn to violence’ to the ANC National
Executive. Mandela warned Kotane that ‘people were already
forming military units on their own’ and told him that ‘his
opposition was like the Communist Party in Cuba’: ‘The party
had insisted that the appropriate conditions had not arrived, and
waited . . . Castro did not wait, he acted — and he triumphed’.62
58 DenisGoldberg, interview byAnthony Sampson, 13Dec. 1996, p. 24,Dep. 168,
Papers of Anthony Sampson, Bodleian Library.
59 Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York, 1961), 15; [Nelson Mandela],
‘Guerrilla Warfare by Che Guevara’, p. 1, Exhibit R25, MS.385/20, Dr Percy Yutar
Papers: The Rivonia Trial, 1963–1964, South African National Archives, Pretoria.
60 Allison Drew, We Are No Longer in France: Communists in Colonial Algeria
(Manchester, 2014), 180–99; Steve Cushion, A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution:
How theWorking Class Shaped the Guerillas’ Victory (NewYork, 2016), 106, 112–13, 126.
61 Turok, interview by Barrell, 1310–11.
62 Mandela, Long Walk, 321.
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9
Some Congress leaders feared that if the Congress movement
waited, and failed to give a lead to grass-roots enthusiasm for
violence, the consequences would not only threaten the
movement’s political position, but would also have a terrible
human cost and threaten post-apartheid reconstruction. The
kind of attacks on white civilians envisaged by some Poqo
adherents — and by ANC supporters like Zuma’s group in
Durban — were exactly the kind of indiscriminate, racialized
violence that Congress leaders had long sought to avert. In his
arguments to the Joint Executives of the Congress Alliance in
June 1961, Mandela focused on the need to pre-empt such
indiscriminate ‘terrorism’. ‘Look this thing has already started
in our country’, he told the meeting. ‘Let us take the same
decision and lead. Because otherwise it will just deteriorate into
a terrorist movement . . . And if it’s a terrorist organisation it’s
going to lead to the slaughter of human beings. Let us enter and
lead’.63 Throughout the 1950s, Congress leaders’ fear of the
human, social and political costs of indiscriminate violence and
‘racial war’ had led them to resist pressure from below to use
violence. In the aftermath of Sharpeville, it was precisely the
same fear that now led some of them to argue that initiating
what Mandela called ‘properly controlled violence’ was the only
means of pre-empting outbreaks of its less controlled forms.64
III
THE SABOTAGE CAMPAIGN
On16December 1961,MKcarried out its first violent actions: in
Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban, home-made bombs
were used to attack ‘government installations, particularly those
connected with the policy of apartheid and race discrimination’,
such as Bantu Administration Offices. These symbolic targets
were empty at the time: the High Command had given strict
instructions to avoid loss of life. The bombings were the first of
approximately two hundred acts of sabotage executed by MK
over the next three years, a majority of them carried out using
incendiary devices or stolen dynamite. TheMKHighCommand
claimed that these non-lethal ‘first actions’ were intended to
63 ‘Mandela–Stengel Conversations’, 522.
64 [Mandela], ‘I Am Prepared to Die’.
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9
produce a psychological effect in the white population: their
manifesto expressed the hope that the bombings would ‘bring
the Government and its supporters to their senses before it is
too late, so that both Government and its policies can be
changed before matters reach the desperate stage of civil war’.65
Mandela and Slovo did not seriously believe that the bombings
would have this effect. Slovo later stressed that ‘Nobody in their
wild imaginings dreamt that one could actually overthrow the
regime or bring about a revolution through overturning a few
pylons and putting some rather weak home-made explosives in
relatively innocuous targets’.66 The initial public claims to the
contrary made by MK were propaganda, intended to convince
sympathizers inside and outside the Congress movement who
were sceptical of the moral legitimacy of lethal interpersonal
violence that the government was to blame for the escalation
that members of the High Command already believed would be
necessary. ‘However forlorn the hope’ that spectacular sabotage
would produce a psychological effect amongst whites, Slovo later
explained, the ‘expression’ of that hope was ‘a politically useful
bridge between the period of non-violent campaigning and the
future people’s armed struggle’, for it would ‘demonstrate that
responsibility for the slide towards bloody civil war lay squarely
with the regime’.67
Rather than seeing sabotage as a free-standing tactic thatwould
be sufficient to change the government and its policies, Mandela
and Slovo sawMK’s first actions as only the first stage of a violent
struggle that would ultimately involve guerrilla warfare. In May
1962, just five months after MK’s first attacks, Mandela and two
of the ANC’s representatives abroad, Oliver Tambo and Robert
Resha, co-authored amemorandum to the government of Ghana
that describedMK as ‘the first phase of a comprehensive plan for
the waging of guerrilla operations’.68
65 Command of Umkonto We Sizwe, ‘Umkonto We Sizwe’, 717.
66 Joe Slovo, ‘The Sabotage Campaign’, Dawn: Journal of Umkhonto we Sizwe,
Souvenir Issue 1986, 24.
67 Joe Slovo, ‘South Africa — No Middle Road’, in Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo and
Anthony R. Wilkinson, Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution
(Harmondsworth, 1976), 186.
68 Oliver Tambo, NelsonMandela and Robert Resha, ‘MemorandumPresented to
theGovernment of the Republic of Ghana by the AfricanNational Congress of South
Africa’, 10 May 1962, BAA/RLAA/757, p. 1, Bureau of African Affairs Collection,
George Padmore Research Library on African Affairs, Accra.
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What still remains to be explained, however, is why the MK
High Command believed a distinct, preliminary ‘first phase’ of
sabotage bombings of symbolic targets in urban areas was
necessary at all. Indeed, not everyone in MK did believe this
was necessary. Govan Mbeki — a founder member of MK in
Port Elizabeth who later joined the High Command — was
apparently amongst those who argued against the sabotage
campaign on the grounds that it would simply ‘unite the
whites’.69 None of the struggles elsewhere that Mandela and
other Congress leaders studied and cited as inspirations had
involved a separate phase of this kind that lasted more than a
few weeks. The FLN had launched its revolt against French
rule in Algeria on 1 November 1954 with co-ordinated attacks
that included attempted sabotage bombings of government
buildings in Algiers. But the FLN did not restrict the attacks it
carried out on its first day to sabotage: FLN guerrillas also
launched assaults against police stations and army barracks, as
well as assassinations of Algerian ‘collaborators’.70 On 12
February 1944, the Irgun — the Zionist paramilitary group
from which Mandela adopted the language of MK’s
organizational structure — relaunched its revolt against British
rule in Palestine with simultaneous bombings in three cities of
symbolic targets: empty offices of the Immigration Department,
which was responsible for implementing British restrictions on
Jewish entry into the territory. But despite the similarities
between the launch of MK and the relaunch of the Irgun’s
revolt, the Irgun did not long restrict itself to non-lethal
sabotage of empty offices. Less than six weeks after the initial
bombings, Irgun fighters killed six British police in armed
commando-style assaults in which they blew up police
headquarters buildings in Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa.71
Nor was the High Command’s choice of symbolic sabotage
influenced by the advice or preferences of MK’s international
patrons. Chinese attitudes had shifted since Sisulu’s visit to
Beijing in 1953. From the late 1950s, the Chinese government
69 Ben Turok, interview by GwendolenM. Carter, 15Mar. 1973, p. 41, ICS143/3/
84, Benjamin Turok Papers, Senate House Library, London.
70 Alistair Horne,ASavageWar of Peace: Algeria 1954–1962 (NewYork, 2006), 83–
104.
71 Bruce Hoffman, Anonymous Soldiers: The Struggle for Israel, 1917–1947 (New
York, 2016), 126–50.
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9
became increasingly enthusiastic in its support of ‘using violence
and arms to conduct struggle’ in the colonized world.72 The
Soviet Union was also taking an increased interest in national
liberation in the global south: in January 1961, Khrushchev
famously announced Soviet support for anti-colonial ‘wars of
national liberation’. In 1960–1 SACP representatives discussed
the adoption of violent methods with officials from both the
Soviet Union and China, and secured promises of support,
including training and funding. But there is no evidence that
these discussions influenced the specific form of MK’s initial
activities. Soviet officials were supportive but cautious,
stressing, as one SACP representative recalled, that the use of
violence ‘was our decision and they were not going to be
involved in that decision’.73 The Chinese were more dogmatic.
In meetings in late 1960 with Mao and other Chinese officials,
SACP representatives were concerned to find that the Chinese
‘el[e]vated into a law-governedprinciple of revolutionary struggle
the Chinese experience of the long march and forms of armed
struggle’, and prioritized the role of the peasantry over that of the
working class.74 The Chinese were apparently nonplussed by
MK’s subsequent campaign of urban sabotage. During a visit to
China in 1962, Arthur Goldreich of MK’s Logistics Committee
asked Chinese officials: ‘What part does sabotage play in the
initial stages in (i) Urban Areas (ii) Rural Areas’[?]. Goldreich’s
Chinese interlocutor replied simply that ‘CHINA had no
experience of Sabotage units in Urban Areas’.75
Part of the reason forMK’s unusual approachwas thatMKhad
neither the capacity nor the authorization to undertake
immediate guerrilla operations. Mandela and his men lacked
experience, training and firepower: at the time of MK’s
founding, they did not possess a single firearm.76 Moreover,
though Mandela and other founders of MK had concluded that
72 Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third
World (Chapel Hill, 2015), 49–57.
73 Joe Matthews, interview by Phil [Bonner], 18 Aug. 1994, p. 17, B6, Harmel
Interviews.
74 Essop Pahad, ‘Dr Y. M. Dadoo: A People’s Leader’, 1979, pp. 217–18, Item
10.26, Brian Bunting Collection, UWC-Robben Island Museum Mayibuye
Archives, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town.
75 [Arthur Goldreich], ‘1st Discussion: C. Lee, Ministry of Defence, China’, p. 9,
Exhibit R4, MS.385/19, Yutar Papers.
76 Slovo, Slovo, 179.
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9
some kind of guerrilla action would ultimately be necessary to
achieve the objective of ending apartheid, they recognized that
the executives of the ANC and the Congress Alliance had not
authorized this at their meetings in June 1961.
Within the constraints imposed by those Congress leaders
sceptical of lethal violence, and by the resources available,
MK’s initial actions could nevertheless have taken several
different forms, for in their decisions in 1960–1, the SACP, the
ANC and the Congress Alliance had failed to define precisely
the specific forms of violence they were authorizing.77 Sabotage
could be ‘hot’ — defined, in notes Mandela made in this period,
as demolition that ‘explodes and changes into smoke and fire’ —
or ‘cold’ (actions such as putting sugar in petrol tanks, cutting
telephone lines and electricity wires or blocking roads with
obstacles such as felled trees).78 It could be directed internally,
within the communities the Congress movement regarded as its
political constituency (for instance to impede strike-breakers), or
externally, against the state or the supporters of apartheid. And
externally directed sabotage could be directed either against
targets whose destruction would impede economic activity, or
against targets whose destruction would symbolize opposition
to apartheid. In mid 1961, before the launch of MK, Slovo’s
SACP squads had started carrying out cold, externally directed
economic sabotage, using cutting tools to sever telephone and
electricity cables.79 This was also the kind of activity initially
preferred by Denis Goldberg and MK’s Regional Command in
Cape Town. But there was a general sense, Goldberg recalled,
that ‘we want big bangs’. TheHighCommand subsequently sent
a representative to teach the Regional Command how to make
gunpowder.80
Some members of MK and the Congress movement who were
not on the High Command implied, at the time or subsequently,
that MK’s initial phase of hot sabotage was launched in order to
‘detonate’ a revolutionary situation in which guerrilla warfare
could be waged effectively. The recent success of the Cuban
77 Simon Stevens, ‘Violence and Political Strategy: The Congress Movement in
South Africa in the Early 1960s’ (unpublished paper, 2016).
78 [NelsonMandela], untitled notes, p. 20, Exhibit R11,MS.385/19, Yutar Papers.
79 Mandela, jail memoir, 423.
80 Denis Goldberg, interview byHoward Barrell, 7 Feb. 1990, pp. 194, 202–4, 1/2,
Barrell Papers.
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Revolution and the writings of Che Guevara had popularized the
idea that violent action by small groups could act as a revolutionary
‘detonator’.81But symbolic urban sabotage bore little resemblance
to Guevara’s concept of the foco, a small band of guerrillas
operating in the countryside.82 When Ronnie Kasrils, a founder
member of the MK Regional Command in Durban, pressed his
superiors on precisely how they envisaged ‘transforming the
sabotage actions into guerilla war’, he received ‘very vague
answers’ and concluded that ‘this had not been worked out’.83
The reason for this vagueness was that the form ofMK’s initial
activities was determined less by the perceived relationship of
those activities to future guerilla action, and more by the same
fears that had gripped many Congress leaders after Sharpeville
and that hadbeen such a crucial factor in thedecision to formMK
in the first place: that grass-roots opponents of apartheid might
take matters into their own hands and initiate ‘uncontrolled’
violence, and that a rival group might outflank the Congress
movement by better channelling popular enthusiasm for violent
action. Events in 1961–2 made these fears even more acute. The
decision to permit the formation ofMK had beenmade in secret.
And though he had acquiesced to that decision in June 1961,
Lutuli continued to extol publicly the virtues of non-violence in
interviews, newspaper columns and public statements.84 On 10
December 1961, Lutuli was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in
recognition of his rejection of ‘the temptation to use violent
means in the struggle for his people’.85 Some Congress leaders
apparently feared that Lutuli’s comments and his acceptance of
the Peace Prize would reinforce perceptions of the Congress
movement as committed to the kind of conciliatory, non-
81 A. Lerumo [Michael Harmel], ‘Forms and Methods of Struggle — The South
AfricanDemocratic Revolution’,AfricanCommunist, Apr.–May 1962, 51; BenTurok,
interview by David Wiley, 12 May 2006, from 22m 12s, South Africa: Overcoming
Apartheid, Building Democracy, available at5http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/
video.php?id¼65-24F-224.
82 Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare; Matt D. Childs, ‘An Historical Critique of the
Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto Che Guevara’s Foco Theory’, Journal of Latin
American Studies, xxvii (1995), 593–606.
83 Ronnie Kasrils, interview by Howard Barrell, Sept. 1990, p. 331, 1/2, Barrell
Papers.
84 Couper, Albert Luthuli, 125–40.
85 Gunnar Jahn, ‘Nobel Presentation’, in Kader Asmal, David Chidester and
Wilmot James (eds.), South Africa’s Nobel Laureates: Peace, Literature, and Science
(Johannesburg, 2004), 20.
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9
confrontational, exclusively non-violent politics with which they
believed many opponents of apartheid were now impatient.86
After touring Africa to secure support for MK during the first
half of 1962, Mandela reported back to other Congress leaders
that Lutuli’s acceptance of the Prize and his ‘extremely
unfortunate’ statements had created the impression that he was
a ‘stooge of whites’.87
While MK was being formed, and the Congress movement’s
most prominent leader accepted the Nobel Peace Prize and
extolled non-violence, rival groups were beginning to initiate
violent action. In September and October 1961 the National
Committee for Liberation carried out its first acts of sabotage:
an arson attack on the Johannesburg Bantu Administration tax
office and the toppling of an electricity pylon whose legs NCL
members sawed through; the latter caused a forty-five-minute
blackout in parts of Johannesburg.88 Meanwhile, in September
1961 a conference of the regrouped leadership of the PAC
formally adopted a strategy of ‘armed struggle’ that was
influenced by ‘the philosophy of Mau Mau’ and would begin
with the terrorization of whites in rural areas.89 In 1962 Poqo
groups, often armed with axes or pangas (machetes), began
carrying out attacks and assassination attempts. These groups,
usually operating autonomously and without explicit direction
from the PAC leadership, targeted police, suspected
collaborators and, more infrequently, white civilians.90
The Congress movement’s rivals were also winning external
support. The Sharpeville massacre of protesters who had been
mobilized by the PAC had catapulted the Pan Africanists into the
international limelight and overshadowed the ANC. Tambo
reported to other ANC leaders in 1962 that after Sharpeville
‘many people outside got the impression that this group [the
PAC] was the most militant one and destined to lead the people
to freedom’.91 The external representatives of the ANC and the
86 Couper, Albert Luthuli, 139; [Karis], ‘Turn to Violence’, 692–3 n. 39.
87 [NelsonMandela], ‘PAFMECSA’, p. 4, Exhibit R13,MS.385/19, Yutar Papers.
88 Gunther, ‘National Committee of Liberation’, 198.
89 Murphy, ‘Race, Violence, and Nation’, 259–60.
90 BrownMaaba, ‘The PAC’sWar against the State, 1960–1963’, in SADET,Road
to Democracy, i, 1960–1970, 240–59.
91 ‘Report on the Lobatsi [sic] Conference’, [c.Nov. 1962], p. 3, 52/2, ANCLusaka
MissionRecords, 1923–1996 [Part 2],NationalHeritage andCultural StudiesCentre
(NAHECS), University of Fort Hare, Alice.
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PAChad agreed in 1960 to co-operate abroad in a ‘South African
United Front’, but by late 1961 this was breaking down. By
December that year, Mandela believed it was necessary, he
later wrote, to ‘boost our reputation in the rest of Africa’.
Congress leaders were concerned that African leaders
elsewhere on the continent favoured the PAC, with its
rhetorical militancy, its anti-communism and its racially
exclusive nationalism.92 They were especially worried about the
attitude of theGhanaian government ofKwameNkrumah,which
had welcomed and assisted PAC officials, but in December 1961
expelled the ANC’s representative from the country. Even the
NCL was benefiting internationally from its apparent militancy:
in April 1961 theGhanaian governmentmade a substantial grant
to a maverick white liberal associated with the NCL, to fund acts
of violent resistance.93
In light of these various developments, the MK High
Command launched its first operations in order to discourage
those opposed to apartheid — inside and outside South Africa
— from backing the Congress movement’s rivals or initiating
‘uncontrolled’ violence on their own. This objective determined
the formofMK’s initial actions. Itwas probably not a coincidence
that the nature and targeting of these actions mimicked — on a
more spectacular scale — those of the NCL a few weeks earlier.
And though there were few international models for a sabotage
campaign of this kind, there was a local South African precedent
that may have influenced the saboteurs of the NCL and/or MK.
In 1941–2, when the founders of the NCL andMKwere in their
teens or twenties, members of the Ossewabrandwag, a far-right
organization of anti-British Afrikaners opposed to the South
African government’s participation in the Second World War,
had used bombs, acid and cutting tools to carry out sabotage
attacks on post offices, railway tracks, and telecommunications
and power cables and pylons.94
92 Mandela, Long Walk, 342; Mandela, jail memoir, 439–40.
93 Scott Thomas,The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the ANC since
1960 (London, 1996), 28–33;W. ScottThompson,Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957–1966:
Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State (Princeton, 1969), 222–4; Gunther, ‘National
Committee of Liberation’, 200–3.
94 George Cloete Visser, OB: Traitors or Patriots? (Johannesburg, 1976), 100–6;
Christoph Marx, Oxwagon Sentinel: Radical Afrikaner Nationalism and the History of
the Ossewabrandwag (Berlin, 2008), 433–6. Intriguingly, Marx suggests that the
Ossewabrandwag’s leaders initiated this sabotage campaign as a ‘security valve for
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For the MK High Command, hot sabotage directed at
symbolic targets was an attention-grabbing placeholder, to be
used until MK had the firepower, the trained men and the
sanction of its parent organizations to use more extensive and
interpersonal forms of guerrilla violence. As the ANC’s ‘Sub-
Committee on our Perspectives’ subsequently noted, MK
initially used sabotage ‘as a form of demonstration’, the
purpose of which was ‘to announce and effect a break with non-
violence’.95 At the Rivonia Trial, Mandela explained that
announcing and effecting such a break served two purposes:
first, to ‘provide an outlet for those people who were urging the
adoption of violent methods’, and second, to ‘enable us to give
concrete proof to our followers that we had adopted a stronger
line, and we were fighting back against Government violence’.96
Concrete proof was also needed to shore up external support:
‘The situation was such’, Slovo later wrote, ‘that without
activity of this nature our whole political leadership may have
been at stake both inside and outside the country’.97
The spectacular big bangs brought about by MK were thus
intended to produce a psychological effect, not — as its manifesto
claimed — amongst the government and its supporters, but
amongst opponents of apartheid. Using locally available expertise
and materiel, hot sabotage could be carried out immediately in
order to neutralize the perceived threats to the Congress
movement’s leadership and its control of its supporters.
In particular, MK’s spectacular attacks on symbols of
apartheid were a dramatic alternative to the kinds of
indiscriminate and racialized interpersonal violence Congress
(n. 94 cont.)
the taut nerves’ of ‘wild young men’ whom the Ossewabrandwag leadership were ‘no
longer able to tame’.
95 ‘Report of Sub-Committee on our Perspectives’, [c.1962–3], p. 1, 53/6, ANC
Lusaka Records [Part 2]. The precise status of this committee is unclear. It may have
been tasked with producing a report either before or after the ANC’s national
conference in October 1962.
96 [Mandela], ‘I Am Prepared to Die’.
97 JoeSlovo, ‘The Strategy andTactics of theRevolution and theRole of theVarious
National Groups and the Revolutionary Forces in the Revolution’, Mar. 1969, pp. 8–
9, Item 2.6.5, Dr Yusuf Mohamed Dadoo Personal Papers, Mayibuye Archives.
A revised version of Slovo’s paper was formally adopted by the exiled ANC’s 1969
national consultative conference atMorogoro,Tanzania: [ConsultativeConference of
the ANC], ‘Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress’, Sechaba: The
Official Organ of the African National Congress South Africa, July 1969.
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9
leaders had long sought to prevent. The sabotage campaign,
Slovo later explained, was to be ‘a graphic pointer to the need
for carefully planned action rather than spontaneous or terroristic
acts of retaliation’.98 In the 1952 Defiance Campaign, Congress
leaders had sought to restrict participation in civil disobedience to
selected volunteers in order to minimize the likelihood of
confrontations escalating out of control and becoming violent.
A decade later, MK’s commanders adapted this model.
Participation in sabotage was restricted to selected volunteers in
order to minimize the likelihood that the initiation of violence
would escalate beyond their control and become
indiscriminate.99
The High Command thus sought, Sisulu later explained, to
‘prevent groups coming up suddenly as sabotage groups
unplanned’, in order to avoid a situation in which ‘people get
wild’.100 Carried out by unknown operatives using home-made
explosives to which most black South Africans did not have
access, MK’s first actions were deliberately non-replicable.
Drawing upon the polemics against ‘terrorism’ and
‘propaganda of the deed’ by Marx and Lenin, some internal
Congress critics — such as the maverick white communist
Rowley Arenstein — argued that the ‘adventurism’ and
‘terrorism’ of MK’s ‘turn to using firecrackers’ would not work
because it would fail to detonate popular political activity: ‘the
people do not learn anything from the activities of the saboteurs,
cannot be inspired by them, and cannot help them’.101 But this
was a feature, not a bug.The immediate objective of theMKHigh
Commandwas to use spectacle, not to detonate popular violence,
but to defuse it.
98 Slovo, ‘South Africa — No Middle Road’, 186.
99 Archie Sibeko, interview by B. Turok, 13 Sept. 1971, p. 6, ICS143/3/90, Turok
Papers. See also Brown, ‘Public Protest and Violence’, 107–9, 118–22.
100 Sisulu, interview by Bonner, 15 July 1993, 24.
101 [Rowley Arenstein], ‘The Immediate Tasks of the National Liberation
Movement: Cause for Alarm’, A8.2b, State vs. David Ernst, Rowley Israel
Arenstein and Joseph Finkelstein, Trial Records, WHP; Ronnie Kasrils, Armed and
Dangerous: From Undercover Struggle to Freedom (Auckland Park, 2013), 26–7.
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IV
AFTERMATH
Within a year ofMK’s launch, Congress leaders believed that the
objectives of its campaign of spectacular symbolic sabotage had
been attained. ‘The purpose for which [sabotage] was originally
embarked upon was to announce and effect a break with
non-violence’, reported the ANC’s ‘Sub-Committee on our
Perspectives’ in mid-to-late 1962 or early 1963. ‘That purpose
has now been achieved’.102 Though both the NCL and Poqo
continued their attacks in 1962–3, neither group eclipsed the
Congress movement. Supporters like Zuma, who had been
impatient with non-violence, were recruited into MK and given
an outlet for their impatience: some participated in sabotage
operations, while others were sent abroad for military training.
Outside the country, the PAC’s momentum was stemmed.
Though the Ghanaian government continued to cold-shoulder
the ANC in favour of the PAC, other independent African
governments took a more even-handed approach to the rival
movements. Tambo reported in October 1962 that the
‘[international] situation had developed very favourably
towards us’ and the impression elsewhere in Africa that the
PAC was ‘most militant’ had ‘cleared’. This was, Tambo
stressed, ‘mainly due to the increased activity of our movement
inside South Africa itself’ — in other words, MK’s campaign of
big bangs.103
TheCongressmovement paid a high price for the achievement
of these objectives, however. The Sub-Committee on our
Perspectives observed that sabotage ‘in the form in which we
employed it in the past’ — as a spectacular demonstration —
‘has cost us a great deal’.104 Congress leaders had not formed
MK out of any belief that there had been a fundamental
alteration in the character of the state in 1960–1. But the
launch of MK’s sabotage campaign did subsequently help
precipitate fundamental alterations in the state’s repressive
capacity. In 1962–3 the government responded to MK’s attacks
(as well as those of the NCL and Poqo) by massively increasing
spending on the police andmilitary, and expanding police powers
102 ‘Report of Sub-Committee on our Perspectives’, 1.
103 ‘Report on the Lobatsi Conference’, 3.
104 ‘Report of Sub-Committee on our Perspectives’, 1.
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of ‘banning’, house arrest and detention without charge. Police
use of torture became widespread.
Perhaps because the audience they had intended to influence
with their sabotage campaign consisted of opponents of
apartheid, not the government and its supporters, MK’s
founders failed to anticipate the ferocity of the government’s
reaction to activity that was, in their eyes, a strictly limited
alternative to the indiscriminate violence they sought to pre-
empt. ‘We did not sufficiently realise that the beginnings of
armed struggle would lead to the very steps which the enemy
took’, Slovo later conceded.105 The massive intensification of
repression quickly took a toll on MK and the Congress
movement. In August 1962, Mandela was caught and
imprisoned. In July 1963, police raided MK’s de facto
headquarters in the Johannesburg suburb of Rivonia and
captured Congress leaders including Sisulu, Mbeki and
Mhlaba, all members of MK’s High Command. By the time of
the subsequent Rivonia Trial, Mandela later observed, ‘acts of
sabotage were fizzling out mainly because the enemy had struck
hard at MK and reduced it to a mere shadow of itself ’.106
The sabotage campaign cost the Congress movement in other
ways as well. Though sabotage had been intended only as a
stopgap activity, it monopolized the attention of MK’s
commanders and those they recruited as saboteurs. Slovo later
reflected that ‘the energies and resources devoted to the planning
and execution of acts of sabotage and to the military apparatus
(and all its auxiliary requirements) began to affect the pace of
political work amongst the people’.107When they authorized the
formation of MK, the constituent bodies of the Congress
movement had agreed that violent action would not be the
centrepiece of the Congress movement’s activity, but rather
a complement to continued non-violent campaigns.108 But
with the attention of the most active Congress leaders focused
exclusively on the bombing campaign, the ANC and its
allies were not organizing any major actions other than
spectacular sabotage.
105 Slovo, ‘Sabotage Campaign’, 25.
106 Mandela, jail memoir, 587.
107 Slovo, ‘South Africa — NoMiddle Road’, 192.
108 Stevens, ‘Violence and Political Strategy’.
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Ben Turok, a white communist who participated in MK’s first
attempted bombings in Johannesburg, later echoed
contemporary critics like Arenstein, pointing out that because
bomb attacks required access to technical equipment and
expertise, ‘sabotage remained the weapon of an elite corps in
the liberation movement’ and ‘had the effect of isolating the
organized movement from the mass who felt unable to join in
this new phase’. Turok concluded, in a sentence often quoted
in subsequent scholarly assessments, that ‘the sabotage campaign
failed on the main count — it did not raise the level of action of the
masses themselves’.109 As we have seen, this defusing effect was
intentional: MK’s campaign of ‘controlled violence’ was
intended to discourage opponents of apartheid from
participating in ‘uncontrolled’ violent activity. But in the
absence of any other major Congress campaigns for supporters
to engage in, the effect was to reduce all popular political
participation. This was quickly recognized: reflecting on the
first months of the sabotage campaign, the ANC’s Sub-
Committee on our Perspectives warned of the danger of
creating ‘the false impression that the masses of the people can
now sit back and watch and leave the struggle to a few unknown,
daring and gallant saboteurs’.110
Congress leaders thus quickly concluded that the sabotage
campaign had achieved its original objectives while also
imposing unexpectedly heavy costs on their movement. Given
this, most active Congress leaders had agreed by mid 1962 that
MK should move on to the next phase of its operations. ‘No
further purpose is served by using sabotage as a form of
demonstration’, insisted the Sub-Committee on our
Perspectives. The nature and purpose of continued sabotage
should shift, the committee argued: sabotage should now be
used in the way prescribed by Guevara in his treatise on
guerrilla warfare, as ‘an auxilliary [sic] to other forms of military
action against an enemy’, a means of ‘weakening and hampering
the [enemy’s] war effort and reducing its fighting potential in
resisting the transfer of political power’.111 In October 1962,
the ANC’s first national conference since the organization’s
109 Ben Turok, Strategic Problems in South Africa’s Liberation Struggle: A Critical
Analysis (Richmond, British Columbia, 1974), 45. Italics in original.
110 ‘Report of Sub-Committee on our Perspectives’, 1.
111 ‘Report of Sub-Committee on our Perspectives’, 1.
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banning explicitly endorsed the position Mandela and Slovo had
held since MK was launched: it characterized the sabotage
campaign as MK’s ‘elementary phase’ and looked ahead to ‘the
advanced stage of guerrilla warfare’.112
But MK found itself unable to move beyond its ‘elementary
phase’. In the course of 1962 and 1963, MK did increase
bombing of economic targets such as electricity pylons and sub-
stations, telephone lines and exchanges and railway tracks, in
addition to symbolic targets associated with the implementation
of apartheid. But there was continuing confusion about target
selection and purpose: Goldberg later commented that ‘we
talked about armed sabotage against symbols of Apartheid, and
at the same time we were talking economic sabotage, and we
seemed to waver in between all these sorts’.113 Though MK’s
commanders understood economic sabotage to be ancillary to
guerrilla warfare, no guerrilla action was launched. The
founders of MK had been bounced into launching the sabotage
campaign by pressure from below and the actions of their rivals.
Thoughmost agreed from the start that spectacular sabotage was
a necessary placeholder until they could launch some form of
guerrilla activity, there was no agreement within the Congress
leadership on what form that activity should take. Like
sabotage, guerrilla action could take different forms and be
used for different purposes. Congress leaders were still furiously
debating the form and purpose of MK’s ‘advanced stage’
when their deliberations were interrupted by the police raid
on Rivonia.114
By the time of the Rivonia Trial, some Congress leaders had
concluded that the sabotage campaign should be halted until the
commencement of whatever form of guerrilla action was
ultimately agreed upon. Continuing to carry out ‘mere acts of
sabotage unaccompanied by armed struggle . . . before the
actual commencement of g[uer]rilla warfare’, some argued,
‘merely exposed our people to the enemy withou[t] equip[p]ing
themselves with the weapons for their defence’. But at the same
time, the government’s crippling response to MK’s first actions
created a new rationale for the continuation of the sabotage
112 ANC National Executive, ‘The People Accept the Challenge’, 749.
113 Goldberg, interview by Sampson, 29.
114 Stevens, ‘Violence and Political Strategy’.
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campaign.115 At its first meeting after the Rivonia raid, MK’s
reconstituted ‘Second High Command’ agreed, one member
later testified, ‘that sabotage should be committed to give the
impression that M.K. was still alive’.116 Originally initiated to
demonstrate to opponents of apartheid that the Congress
movement had responded to popular pressure to abandon
exclusive non-violence, sabotage was now continued in order to
demonstrate to the same audience that the movement had not
been destroyed by the government’s reaction.
However, MK proved unable to sustain the sabotage
campaign. Having observed a moratorium on sabotage during
the Rivonia Trial to avoid prejudicing the trial’s outcome,
members of the Second High Command were themselves
arrested within four months of the relaunch of the campaign in
June 1964. Leadership of the Congress movement subsequently
devolved to those who had left the country: exiled Congress
leaders unexpectedly found themselves in command of the
several hundred MK recruits who had been sent abroad for
guerrilla training and then been unable to return home. The
ANC’s exiled leadership formally decided, as a report by the
Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity
later summarized, ‘to suspend acts of sabotage inside South
Africa until such a time that its cadres are in a position to
counter any resultant retaliatory measures or acts of terrorism
which such a method of warfare could instigate or invite upon
the African population from the South African forces’.117For the
next decade, the ANC’s exiled leaders instead focused their
attention on almost entirely unsuccessful efforts to re-infiltrate
their trained guerrillas into the country.
In retrospect, Slovo always insisted that MK’s sabotage
campaign had been necessary. Had the Congress movement
failed to take any kind of violent action at that moment, he
argued, ‘it would have disappeared as a viable agency for
change’.118 And if that had happened, many Congress leaders
115 Mandela, jail memoir, 587.
116 ‘I. D. Kitson (AccusedNo. 2)’, in ‘Record of Proceedings’, 18Nov. 1964, p. 83,
File 2, Records of the Trial [of] Mkwayi, W., and Others, WHP.
117 Organisation of African Unity, Co-Ordinating Committee for the Liberation of
Africa, ‘Executive Secretary’s Brief’, 30 Apr. 1968, p. 7, FA 1/1/261, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Records, National Archives of Zambia, Lusaka.
118 Slovo, ‘South Africa — No Middle Road’, 196.
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9
believed, the consequences would have been disastrous not only
for the Congress movement but for South Africa. At the fiftieth
anniversary commemoration of the Rivonia raid, South Africa’s
then president, Jacob Zuma argued that ‘tragedy could have
happened if MK [was] not there to channel energy away’ from
indiscriminate violence.119 Certainly, the survival of the
Congress movement — and of its commitment to avoiding
extensive violence against civilians — was not inevitable. But it
is more open to question whether the movement’s continued
existence as a viable agency for change was assisted or impeded
by the particular form of violence chosen by the MK High
Command in 1961. Launched precipitously as a stopgap
measure to shore up support, MK’s ‘first phase’ of spectacular
sabotage contributed to creating conditions in which for years
afterwards the Congress movement inside South Africa was
unable to initiate any large-scale violent or non-violent action
against apartheid.
University of Sheffield Simon Stevens
119 Carien du Plessis (@carienduplessis), Twitter post, 11 July 2013, 9.11 p.m.,
5https://twitter.com/carienduplessis/status/3554039142852853764.
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